Physicians who make mistakes are not necessarily negligent, contrary to prevailing opinion in the medical community. The article discusses the legal concepts of "standard of care" and "proximate cause." The incidence of favorable jury verdicts in those cases in which malpractice suits are litigated is quite high. The effects of insurance company policies in decisions about settlements on the incidence of claims is discussed and alternatives are suggested. The prevailing belief that a consent form with a patient's signature on it is sufficient to prevent a malpractice suit is also discussed.
Most physicians, including those who practice in academic environments, are now extremely concerned about the threat of malpractice litigation. A good deal of this anxiety is probably unnecessary. There is a current tendency to believe that any error of judgment will result in a judgment for the patient in a law suit and that any written form with the patient's signature on it, consenting to anything, will ward off these evil spirits. Both of these conclusions are unfounded. After the physician-patient relationship has been established, the physician is obligated to diagnose and treat the patient's illness with "due care." Failure to use due care constitutes negligence, for which the patient may recover monetary damages, but as courts have indicated, since at least the case of Slater v. Baker and Stapleton [1] in 1767, an error ofjudgment or a bad result is, by no means, assumed to be negligence. The standard used by courts in determining whether or not there has been a breach of duty in any negligence action is the "reasonable man" rule. In any professional liability suit-against a physician, a lawyer, or an architect-"the reasonable man" becomes "the duly careful member of the profession" [2] . Thus, if the physician uses due skill, care, and knowledge in attempting to treat the patient, even though the outcome is unsatisfactory there will be no negligence, as a matter of law.
To [3] , is a failure to recognize that an elderly person has fractured a hip in a fall. Since the patient would have been sent to bed even under a finding that there was no fracture, and since an elderly person with a fractured hip is sent to bed, discovery two weeks later that a fracture was missed is usually not held to constitute grounds for recovery of damages. Prolongation of the treatment process, if significant, may however, in and of itself, be an element of the damage that the patient alleges.
The standard of care required is that of the reasonably careful physician with the same training. Thus, it is quite clear that specialists are held to a standard much higher than generalists in treating conditions within their speciality. In fact, specialists are now held to national standards of care. A Board-Certified internist in a town of 5,000 is thus held to the same standard of care as a tenured professor of medicine in a teaching hospital. The locality rule, which stated that the degree of care required is measured by "that obtaining in the same or similar communities" is no longer applied to specialists. The courts had invented that rule to protect doctors in isolated geographical situations at a time when transportation and communication were wellnigh impossible. As it has become easier for physicians to keep up with advances in medical care, the reason for the locality rule no longer exists. It has been universally rejected in almost all cases involving specialists in courts all over the country. It is no longer applied even to generalists in some states, although other states still accept it [4] .
The 1973 Presidential Commission on Malpractice surveyed all the cases closed by all the commercial malpractice carriers in 1970, thus reflecting suits filed for several years, and discovered that in cases that go to jury trial, physicians win almost 80 percent of the actions [5] . The percentage of successful suits today is probably higher because it is the policy of commercial insurance companies to settle cases as cheaply as possible without regard to the existence or absence of provable negligence [6] . Thus, a very small number of suits are ever tried and those that are tried are the ones that can be won without undue expenses.
Commercial insurance companies are, after all, profit-making organizations. If the adjustors can settle a nuisance claim for $2,500, even though they recognize that there was no negligence involved in the care of the patient, rather than pay $5,000 to $10,000 in legal fees to take the matter to trial and win it, they are certainly going to opt for the quick settlement as a matter of financial self-interest. Needless to say, the settlements accumulated during the year are also a decisive factor in the computation of premiums for the next year [7] .
Since this method of dealing with cases is known to claimants' lawyers in each community, there is often no hesitation about filing a suit, sometimes even without having the chart read by an outside expert to confirm the existence of negligence. "Lawyer letters,"-a notification to a physician that a claim exists, and "if you do not pay money, we will file a suit,"-are frequently written only on the basis of what the client has told the lawyer and before the chart has even been requested by the lawyer from the Record Room of the hospital. Since the dated authorization from the patient to the hospital requesting that a copy of the record be sent to the lawyer is placed in the patient's chart, as is a dated notation by the Record Room clerk as to the date the record was sent to the lawyer, it is quite easy to determine whether the lawyer letter preceded the receipt of the record. My experience would indicate that it happens with roughly one-third of the lawyer letters received at Yale-New Haven Hospital.
On the other hand, in those instances where physicians have joined doctor-owned, medical society-sponsored insurance programs of one sort or another, one of the motivations for changing to the program has been an unwillingness to pay off nuisance claims [8] . It is reported as anecdotal by many lawyers involved in these selfinsurance programs that as soon as it becomes common knowledge that the institution or group is insuring itself, the number of lawyer letters and suits received diminishes rapidly. The implicit message to plaintiffs' lawyers in the community from an institution or group of physicians who have gone self-insured is that if they want to get any money, in all but a few cases of obvious negligence, they should be prepared to go to trial. Bearing in mind that a lawyer who takes a case on a contingency fee and who loses gets nothing, the number of claims filed can be expected to diminish. No empirical studies, as far as I am aware, have ever compared the number of claims filed against institutions while commercially insured, and then several years later after they have gone into a self-insurance scheme, but it would be extremely surprising if the number of nuisance claims has not dropped quite remarkably.
It may be more expensive at the beginning of a self-insurance program to spend the money required to retain excellent defense counsel to prepare these cases thoroughly and go to court and win them. It may, in the end, resolve as a policy decision as to whether an institution would rather pay $25,000 once or $2,500 ten times in a given year. The former policy, I believe, is more likely to solve the malpractice problem on a long-term basis. Moreover, a policy in which an institution defends its doctors, regardless of cost, where the peers of the physician are convinced that there was no negligence and the claim is non-meritorious, may have psychological advantages to the group. Physicians may be less distressed by the spectre of the Ghost of Malpractice Past hanging over them as they work each day if they no longer feel abandoned by the institution. Institutional policies that approach the malpractice issue must, in fact, take into consideration such factors as the way the physicians view claims defense, since most cases of any severity brought against an academic institution or a teaching hospital allege doctor-error, not errors of judgment by other professionals.
Since physicians who have "gone bare" and dropped all insurance have no reporting mechanism by which the numbers of suits can be determined, it is impossible to know what effect this trend has had on the number of cases filed against them. However, any physician can make a negligent mistake that kills or cripples a patient and failure to insure raises serious ethical issues when the patient has no recourse for the compensation of a valid claim. Moreover, schemes to "go bare" and put all assets in a spouse's or child's name may, if a judgment is awarded to a patient and not paid, result in a suit for fraudulent concealment of assets, in addition to the original one for malpractice.
Another common misconception of physicians about malpractice problems is that if they get a patient to sign a form saying, "I consent," their worries will be over. The doctrine of informed consent is a highly complex one, involving negotiations with the patient about a proposal for treatment. Legal rules require that a patient be informed of the nature and purpose of the treatment, its risks, the possible benefits, the alternatives (including the alternative of non-treatment), and the risks of each alternative. This is a very neat way to explain what is required; it is of very little help to a physician who is trying to do his or her best in discussions with the patient. For example, a lawyer cannot tell a physician how to define "risk," for purposes of disclosure to a patient. It is that which most physicians would agree is a risk. For example, does one case report constitute notice of risk so that forever after, all physicians obtaining consent for that procedure must mention it to the patient?
Divested of the mysteries imposed by decisions written by appellate judges, many of whom apparently do not consider that doctors are required to apply the language of those opinions in their daily dealings with patients, the doctrine of informed consent is really very simple. As one court eloquently put it: "The informed consent doctrine is based on the proposition that every competent patient is the final arbitor of whether or not he gets cut, by whom he gets cut and where he gets cut. A patient has the sovereign choice of whether he will submit to surgery in the course of the diagnosis and treatment and in order to make this choice meaningful and realistic, the doctor is under a legal duty to disclose to a patient any serious risks involved in the contemplated surgery and the alternatives available to him, including the risks from non-treatment" [9] . Thus, the patient must 
